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Investigating the effect of tendering capabilities on SME activity 
and performance in public contract competitions 
 
Abstract  
Barriers to SME participation in public procurement have been the focus of research for 
many years. Much less attention has been paid to the predictors of SME success. This 
paper examines the role that tendering capabilities - relational and procedural - play in 
explaining SME activity and performance in public contract competitions. Analysis of 
primary survey data from 3010 SMEs supports a capability-based perspective. 
Procedural capability has a significant effect on number of tenders submitted and value 
of contract sought. Relational capability does not. However, procedural and relational 
capability each has a significant and positive effect on contract win-ratio and percentage 
of total revenue derived from public contracts. For SMEs, these findings underline the 
importance of investing in tendering skills and devising buyer engagement strategies. 
Enterprise support agencies and public sector organisations can play their part through 
the provision of targeted training programmes and better communication with SME 
suppliers respectively. 
Keywords 
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Introduction  
Small and medium-size enterprise (SME) involvement in the public sector marketplace 
has been the subject of investigation for some time. To date, research has focused on 
explicating the barriers SMEs encounter when competing for public sector contracts. 
Loader’s (2013) comprehensive review of evidence in this area shows that SMEs’ 
difficulties emanate not only from the unfamiliarity of public sector culture, policy 
ambiguity and questionable purchasing professionalism, but also unwieldy tendering 
systems and SMEs’ limited resources to cope with them. These issues account in no 
small part for the under-representation of SMEs as public sector suppliers in most 
countries (Cabinet Office, 2013; MacManus, 1991; PwC, 2014). In response to this less 
than satisfactory situation it has become standard for governments to enact policies 
aimed at facilitating greater SME involvement in public procurement (OECD, 2013). 
These ‘SME-friendly’ policies have also received academic attention, and the 
justification for them and their likely effectiveness has been critically assessed 
(Nicholas and Fruhmann, 2014). Latterly, evidence has started to emerge on public 
buyers’ compliance with these policies and the conditions that support or obstruct their 
implementation (Flynn and Davis, 2015). Initial indications are that there is still some 
way to go before ‘SME-friendly’ practices become fully institutionalised in public 
procurement.  
 
The factors that predict SME activity and performance in public sector tendering have 
received comparably less attention. In effect, we know more about what stymies small 
suppliers than what stimulates them to compete for and win public sector contracts. Not 
surprisingly, recent empirical studies have sought to redress this imbalance. Reijonen et 
al., (2014), for example, modelled SME tendering activity as a function of 
entrepreneurial orientation. Their findings revealed proactivity and innovativeness to be 
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positively related to SMEs’ propensity to search and bid for public sector contracts. 
Similarly, Tammi et al., (2014) found that the ability of SMEs to gather market-relevant 
information and leverage it for competitive positioning is associated with higher 
contract search and bid submission activity. Resource-based perspectives on SME 
involvement in public procurement have also been advanced. In this vein, Karjalainen 
and Kemppainen (2008) determined that legal and administrative resources can act as 
predictors of SME public contracting activity, and that electronic order processing 
systems increase the likelihood of SMEs working as public sector suppliers. Temponi 
and Cui (2008) made the same argument in relation to e-commerce and SME public 
contracting activity, but could not find evidence in support of it.  
 
Several reasons explain why evidence on the enablers of SME tendering activity and 
performance has not been more forthcoming. Firstly, and as already mentioned, the 
negative aspects of public procurement for SMEs have been accorded precedence 
(Loader, 2013). This has tended to obscure the fact that some SMEs are capable, 
successful tenderers. Secondly, research on the role of SMEs in public procurement has 
been descriptive rather than predictive in form. Another reason is that scholars have 
privileged public buyers as actors of primary interest (Murray, 2009; Withey, 2011). A 
more prosaic cause is to do with challenges around identifying and accessing the 
population of interest. Not all small firms compete for public contracts, which makes 
securing data that is representative and of sufficient quantity problematic. The fact that 
public procurement has largely fallen under the radar of the SME research community 
means that it has not benefited from the application of predictive models to do with 
growth, innovativeness and competitiveness in small firms. Finally, allowance must be 
made for the relative newness of public procurement as a field of academic inquiry 
(Snider and Rendon, 2008).  
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Building on recent scholarship, our study aims to contribute to a better understanding of 
the enablers of SME activity and performance in public procurement. It does so by 
seeing tendering as a firm-level capability that comprises discrete relational and 
procedural dimensions. These are believed to be significant in explaining SME activity 
and performance in contract competitions. The capability-based perspective put forward 
here is original. Importantly, it takes cognisance of the idiosyncratic nature of public 
procurement and the particular demands it makes of suppliers. At the same time it 
complements a nascent line of inquiry based on entrepreneurial, market positioning and 
resource-based explanations of SME participation in public procurement (Karjalainen 
and Kemppainen, 2008; Reijonen et al., 2014; Tammi et al., 2014; Temponi and Cui, 
2008). Moreover, it extends this line by investigating not only tendering activity but 
also performance outcomes. To our knowledge this is the first study that goes beyond 
firm characteristics in attempting to explain SME performance in public procurement. 
The study also helps to connect SME-public procurement research to mainstream 
debates on the drivers of SME competitiveness (Barbero et al., 2011; Koryak et al., 
2015; Rice et al., 2015). Having information on the determinants of SME involvement 
in contract competitions is also crucial for policy-practice. Heretofore, support for 
SMEs has largely come through reform of purchasing practices. Necessary as these 
reforms are, enhancing SMEs’ capabilities is the other side of the coin in ensuring that 
they can compete more effectively and secure a larger share of the market.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised into five main sections. The first section 
outlines why the agenda for SME competitiveness has come to be interleaved with 
public procurement. The second section takes a capability-based perspective on 
tendering by detailing how relational and procedural capabilities can affect SME 
activity and performance in public procurement. The third section deals with the 
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mechanics of the research, including: operationalisation and measurement of the 
predictor and outcome variables; selection of Ireland as the research context; and e-
surveying the population cohort of firms active in public procurement. Issues around 
data representativeness are addressed before key statistical descriptors for the 
respondents are set out. The fourth section reports on the results of the study. A two-
step hierarchical regression model is used to test the impact of relational and procedural 
capabilities on measures of tendering activity and performance. The results are then 
subject to discussion in the fifth and final section. Their contribution to research at the 
intersection of SMEs and public procurement is made clear, as is their implications for 
practice. The study alights on recommendations to take this line of inquiry forward in 
the coming years.  
The SME-public procurement nexus 
SMEs have become central to discourse on public procurement. Elected representatives 
frequently state their commitment to ensuring that SMEs have maximum practical 
opportunity to compete for business with the public sector. Pledges of support have 
translated into explicit policy initiatives. A recent survey of OECD members’ public 
procurement systems found that 29 of 32 countries had instituted some type of support 
mechanism for SMEs, and 11 of these had enacted policies or made specific legislative 
provisions (OECD, 2013). That SMEs and public procurement are increasingly 
discussed in the same context is the result of two overlapping developments. The first is 
the centrality of SMEs to enterprise policy and ideas around future economic 
competitiveness. It is, as Storey (1994:253) presciently observed some twenty years 
ago, ‘no longer possible to discuss economic policy without recognising the role which 
small firms play in the economy and in the rest of society more generally’. The EU 
Small Business Act and its exhortation to ‘think small first’ bears this out (European 
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Commission, 2008). The second is the recognised potential of public procurement to 
undergird SME competitiveness. Expenditure on goods and services by public sector 
organisations approximates to 16% of EU GDP or, in monetary terms, €1.7 trillion. As 
such, it represents a significant market for commercial actors, SMEs included. What is 
more, it is under the control of government and, within legal limits, can be leveraged to 
strengthen the SME sector and foster entrepreneurship (Preuss, 2011).   
 
Public contracts are an attractive proposition for SMEs on many levels. For a start, they 
represent stable and predictable sources of demand (Fee, et al., 2002; Pickernell et al., 
2011). Stability and predictability, in turn, afford SMEs security to plan for the future, 
invest in new technology and recruit staff. They also come with near certainty of 
payment (Loader, 2005; MacManus, 1991). Supplying the public sector can burnish a 
SME’s reputation and help them graduate from low value market niches to the 
mainstream commercial environment (Ram and Smallbone, 2003). It can even act as a 
demand-side stimulant to innovation when buyers insist on technologically-
sophisticated products or encourage firms to develop novel service solutions (Georghiou 
et al., 2014). Public sector organisations, too, stand to gain from SME involvement in 
contract competitions. SMEs can offer competitive pricing arrangements on account of 
their minimal administrative overheads and streamlined operations. Aside from this, 
SMEs add to ‘the quantity and quality of competition in public markets’ (European 
Commission, 1990:2). In terms of innovativeness, SMEs’ ability to recognise 
opportunities and leverage capabilities to create novel products and services can make 
them valuable supply partners (Woldesenbet et al., 2012).  
 
While it may be mutually beneficial for SMEs and public sector organisations to do 
business, the reality of everyday procurement presents a less sanguine picture. SMEs 
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have consistently expressed their dissatisfaction with public sector tendering processes 
and procedures (Loader, 2015; MacManus, 1991) and have rated doing business with 
the private sector more favourably (Purchase et al., 2009). These negative sentiments 
find confirmation in SMEs’ low participation and success rates in public procurement. 
As of 2011, only one in five small firms in the UK was using the internet to either 
access public sector tender documents or sell to public sector organisations (ONS, 
2012). Supportive of this data, BMG Research (2013) found that out of a sample of 
5000 UK SMEs only 10% had bid for a public sector contract in the previous year. 
SMEs’ performance outcomes are no better. Nationally and internationally SMEs 
under-perform relative to their actual number and GDP contribution. Between 2006 and 
2008 SMEs won 60% of above-threshold contracts in the EU as against their 99.8% 
presence in the enterprise population (GHK, 2010). This equated to 33% of the total 
value of above-threshold contracts - some 20% lower than their GDP contribution. In 
the UK 10.5% of direct spend and 9.4% of indirect spend was going to SMEs as of 
2013, substantially below their numbers and value-added contribution in the economy 
(Cabinet Office, 2013). 
 
The reasons why SMEs struggle with public procurement can be understood in terms of 
an unfamiliar and not always efficient marketplace, bureaucratic tendering procedures 
and the resource limitations inherent in being a small firm (Loader, 2013). Taking the 
first of these issues, public procurement has been criticised for low professionalism and 
high risk aversion (Georghiou et al., 2014; Loader, 2005). In an international context, 
half of OECD countries are said to lack adequate procurement capability as measured 
by the number of public buyers and their levels of professional expertise (OECD, 2013). 
Underneath this are problems specific to the public tendering system. These include 
poorly advertised opportunities, onerous qualification criteria, the large size of public 
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contracts, and high transaction costs (Cabras, 2011; European Commission, 1990; Fee et 
al., 2002; Flynn et al., 2013). In the case of the latter, the economic cost of compiling a 
bid for a standard service contract is estimated to be as much as £3200 in the EU and 
£5800 in the UK (Centre for Economic and Business Research, 2013). SMEs’ 
difficulties are not confined to the external environment. Some are simply the product of 
their small size, limited resource base and low profile in the supply marketplace (Flynn 
et al., 2015; GHK, 2010; Karjalainen and Kemppainen, 2008).  
Tendering capabilities 
Evident from the foregoing discussion, the marketplace for public sector contracts is at 
once attractive and challenging for SMEs. In seeking to determine the factors that lead 
to SME success in public procurement, it is instructive to see tendering as a distinctive 
firm-level capability. By capability is meant the ability of a firm to exploit its resources 
using various processes and routines in furtherance of competitive advantage (Javidan, 
1998; Stalk et al., 1992). Specifically in the context of public procurement, capability 
denotes the ability of a firm to marshal its organisational resources in order to identify 
contract opportunities and subsequently position itself to exploit them. It is the ability to 
leverage organisational resources – human, technological, financial, administrative, 
network and reputational – that is posited here to be a crucial determinant of the success 
of SMEs in contract competitions. Recent scholarship points to the efficacy of taking a 
capability or even dynamic capability perspective in this area. Woldesenbet et al., 
(2012) explained SME supply relationships with large corporations in terms of 
entrepreneurship, networking, resource integration and strategic service delivery 
capabilities. Tangentially, Barbero et al., (2011) linked managerial capabilities to SME 
growth trajectories, finding marketing and financial capabilities to be particularly 
salient. Koryak et al., (2015) did something similar, albeit with a focus on growth-
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oriented capabilities in SMEs and their relationship to market penetration, product 
development and market development.         
 
The nature of public procurement gives some indication of the capabilities that SMEs 
need to possess to succeed. More so than in the private sector, public procurement is 
bound up with ‘public value’ goals and the imperatives of transparency and 
accountability in commercial transactions (Lian and Laing, 2004). The effect, at least 
from a supplier perspective, is that public sector tendering is bureaucratic, formalised 
and legalistic in nature. The typical barriers cited by SMEs, such as lengthy form filling, 
high compliance costs and qualification standards disproportionate to the risk profile of 
the contract bear this out (Baden et al., 2011; Cabras, 2011; Fee et al., 2002; Loader, 
2015). Success depends on SMEs being able to draw on their human, social and 
financial capital to surmount these challenges and compile a bid that responds to the 
buyer’s expectations. Public sector tendering is not only a paper-based exercise. Just as 
in the private sector, relationships matter (McKevitt and Davis, 2015). As such, success 
is also contingent on the ability of firms to engage with public buyers, market their 
goods and services to them, and challenge their pre-conceptions of smaller suppliers and 
what they can offer. All this suggests that relational and procedural capabilities are 
important for explaining activity and performance in public contract competitions (see 
Figure 1). These capabilities are subject to further consideration below. 
Relational capability  
At its most fundamental relational capability is about SMEs being able to promote 
themselves as credible suppliers to the public sector. A common complaint of SMEs is 
that public buyers rely on large, established suppliers to the exclusion of smaller, 
younger firms (Loader, 2005, 2015; Walker and Preuss, 2008). By being proactive and 
marketing their business by, for example, attending trade fairs, arranging product 
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demonstrations, or exploiting social media, SMEs can increase their visibility to buyers 
and showcase their attributes. Relational capability is more than SMEs raising their own 
profile. It also involves influencing tender specifications where at all possible. This is 
important as narrow bid specifications and overly prescriptive requirements can have 
the effect of precluding SME access to competitions (Loader, 2005, 2015). So too can 
situations in which the emphasis is placed on short-term cost savings rather than 
achieving value for money over the long-term (Cabras, 2011). Anything that SMEs can 
do to influence public buyers’ priorities and shift award criteria towards their own 
strengths, particularly on innovativeness and customer responsiveness (Woldesenbet et 
al., 2012), should advantage them. Relational capability is also about creating demand 
for new products and services and informing public buyers’ purchasing intentions 
before they ever issue a formal request for tender (RFT). Pre-tender engagement of this 
kind has been shown to be associated with above-average bid outcomes for SMEs by 
McKevitt and Davis (2013).  
 
Relational capability is predicted to impact SME tendering activity and performance 
outcomes as follows. To the extent that SMEs interact with and make themselves visible 
to public buyers, they are more likely to be invited to tender, added to shortlists or even 
consulted about supply requirements at the pre-tender phase; all of which should result 
in more tenders being submitted. Research by Reijonen et al., (2014) has already shown 
that proactive marketplace behaviour on the part of SMEs is linked to higher levels of 
tendering activity. Relational capability is anticipated to affect the financial value of 
contracts sought. A proven ability to engage public buyers and persuade them of their 
value proposition provides firms with the confidence and the opportunity to pursue 
larger value contracts. Relational capability is also expected to be associated with 
contract win-rates. Two points are relevant here. First, cultivating relationships can help 
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to counteract the risk and uncertainty factors that dissuade buyers from awarding 
contracts to small but otherwise competent suppliers (GHK and Technopolis, 2007). 
Second, by influencing public buyers’ demand specifications SMEs can ensure that they 
are prime contenders when the RFT is made public. Finally, relational capability is 
anticipated to predict the percentage of revenue that SMEs derive from public 
contracting. The rationale is that possessing such capability is conducive to firms 
building up a client portfolio and revenue stream that includes public as well as private 
sector organisations. Taking the above points together it is hypothesised that:   
 
 H1a: Relational capability has a positive effect on tendering frequency  
 
H1b: Relational capability has a positive effect on contract value sought 
H1c: Relational capability has a positive effect on contract-win ratio  
H1d: Relational capability has a positive effect on the percentage of total revenue 
derived from public contracting 
 
Procedural capability  
Procedural capability embodies a firm’s ability to deal with the administrative and 
technical demands of the tendering process. In the first instance it means being able to 
comprehend what it is that public buyers are looking for from their suppliers and the 
criteria that they use to evaluate them. While this may seem self-evident, criticisms have 
been directed at SMEs for failing to show due appreciation of the needs and 
expectations of public buyers (Greer, 1999; Michaelis et al., 2003). Procedural 
capability also means that a firm is able to satisfy public buyers that they meet the 
minimum qualification standards. Inter alia, this can include demonstrating supply 
experience, financial probity, professional competence, and compliance with 
environmental standards and employment rights (Withey, 2011). Providing evidence to 
substantiate any claims made is crucial in this regard. Leading on from comprehending 
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the tender evaluation criteria and being able to satisfy them, firms must also be 
proficient at articulating their strengths as a supplier in the written tender submission. 
Many SMEs struggle on this dimension, not only because of the substantial time and 
resource commitment involved (Baden et al., 2011; Flynn et al., 2013), but also because 
of the specialist technical, legal and public policy knowledge that is often required 
(Karjalainen and Kemppainen, 2008).  
 
Procedural capability is relevant even after the tendering process has been completed 
and the contract has been awarded. In the event of a failed bid firms need to know how 
to obtain feedback from public buyers. The benefit to a firm of obtaining feedback is 
that the relative strengths and weaknesses of their bid are made apparent. This same 
information can then be used to salutary effect in devising future bid strategies, as the 
reported experiences of both SMEs and public buyers attest (Flynn et al., 2013). With 
tendering, as with much else besides, the key to success is the capacity to learn from 
failure. Firms also need to know how to search contract award notices and identify the 
winner or winners of competitions in which they were involved. In the event of a 
successful bid it is critical that firms exhibit competence and dependability in managing 
the contract over its duration (McKevitt and Davis, 2013). Ability to deliver as 
promised and in line with agreed contractual terms can generate new business 
opportunities with the same or different public sector customers. Conversely, exposed 
weakness in contract management damages a firm’s credibility and undermines their 
prospects of securing new contracts with public sector organisations.    
 
Like relational capability, procedural know-how is predicted to directly affect SME 
tendering activity and performance. To begin with, it should lead firms to tender more 
frequently. The ability to discern what public buyers are looking for and respond 
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accordingly makes tendering a more manageable and less intimidating process. The 
time and resource implications of tendering also reduce insofar as firms can take a more 
purposeful approach to compiling their bid. The latter is significant as projected 
tendering costs are a principal cause of firms deciding not to progress past the contract 
identification stage (Centre for Economic and Business Research, 2013). Procedural 
capability should also be associated with firms competing for higher value contracts. 
This is because astuteness in navigating the procedural aspects of tendering makes it 
feasible not only to compete for bigger contracts but also to manage them post-contract 
award. Given the formalised and legalistic character of public procurement (Lian and 
Laing, 2004), procedural capability is expected to be a significant predictor of contract 
win-rates. First, it is essential if firms are to meet the qualification standard (Withey, 
2011). Thereafter, it determines how well a firm performs against the objective and 
subjective criteria applied at the formal tender evaluation phase; and ultimately whether 
the firm is awarded the contract or not. The last relationship concerns procedural 
capability and public contracts as a percentage of revenue. Procedural capability 
improves the cost-benefit ratio of tendering, so that firms shift more of their operational 
focus and revenue seeking activity to the public sector. These points give the following 
four hypotheses: 
       
H2a: Procedural capability has a positive effect on tendering frequency  
H2b: Procedural capability has a positive effect on contract value sought  
H2c: Procedural capability has a positive effect on contract-win ratio  
H2d: Procedural capability has a positive effect on the percentage of total revenue 
derived from public contracting 
 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
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Methodology 
Independent variables 
The tendering capability constructs were developed specifically for the purposes of this 
study. Consistent with recommended practice (Dillman, 2007), advice from a panel of 
experts was sought as part of this process. Relational capability comprises three items. 
These are (i) ability to influence buyer needs prior to tender (ii) ability to communicate 
a value proposition to inform tender specification and (iii) ability to promote goods and 
services to public buyers prior to tender. A five-point scale is used to measure each item 
where 1 = very poor and 5 = excellent. A principal component analysis with Varimax 
Rotation confirms the presence of a single construct. The construct is found to be 
reliable (α = 0.87). Procedural capability comprises five items. These are (i) ability to 
understand contract qualification criteria (ii) ability to satisfy contract qualification 
criteria (iii) ability to effectively respond to contract qualification criteria (iv) ability to 
receive feedback and search contract award notices and (v) ability to successfully 
manage contracts. A five-point scale is also used to measure each of the five items 
where 1 = very poor and 5 = excellent. After performing a principal component analysis 
with Varimax Rotation a single construct emerges and is found to be reliable (α = 0.84). 
Further detail on the factor loadings for each of the two constructs is given in Table 1.      
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
Dependent variables 
Four variables are predicted to be dependent on relational and procedural capabilities. 
These are tendering frequency, contract value sought, contract win-ratio, and public 
contracts as a percentage of revenue. Similar to Reijonen et al., (2014), tendering 
frequency is taken as the number of contracts SMEs tendered for with public sector 
organisations throughout 2013. The typical value of a contract sought is measured by 
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reference to six financial ranges: €1-25,000; €25-130,000; €130-250,000; €250-
500,000; €500-1,000,000; and €1,000,000+. Contract win-ratio is operationalised as the 
percentage of public contracts tendered for throughout 2013 that a firm succeeded in 
winning. The fourth dependent variable is the percentage of annual revenue that is 
attributable to public contracting.  
Control variables 
Three variables are controlled for in this study. These are size, age and sector. Firm size 
has emerged as a predictor of involvement and performance in public sector tendering 
across numerous studies (GHK and Technopolis, 2007; GHK, 2010; Pickernell et al., 
2011; PwC, 2014; Temponi and Cui, 2008). It is also linked to the human and 
administrative resources firms have at their disposal for tendering (Flynn et al., 2015; 
Karjalainen and Kemppainen, 2008). Size is approximated by number of employees. In 
line with EU classification standards four size ranges are used for measurement 
purposes: 1-9 employees (micro); 10-49 employees (small); 50-249 employees 
(medium); and 250+ employees (large). Firm age has also emerged as a significant 
variable for explaining involvement in public procurement. Evidence adduced by 
Pickernell et al., (2013) and Reijonen et al., (2014) indicates that older firms have 
higher levels of tendering activity. Age is measured as the number of years a firm has 
been trading. Sectoral effects have also been linked to SME participation and success in 
public procurement (Pickernell et al., 2011; PwC, 2014; Reijonen et al., 2014). Sector is 
captured by reference to the four categories of construction, manufacturing, services, 
and other. 
Research context 
The Irish marketplace for public sector contracts is the context for the study. Annual 
public procurement expenditure in Ireland is in the region of €16 billion, which equates 
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to 10% of GDP. The public procurement field in Ireland has undergone a series of 
changes over the last decade. Similar to stances adopted across EU Member States, 
policies have been enacted by successive governments to reform public procurement in 
the interests of SME participation. The purpose of these policies is to create a ‘level 
playing field’ on which small suppliers can compete for and win public contracts; 
evident, for example, in Facilitating SME Access to Public Procurement (Department of 
Finance, 2010). This is to be achieved by getting public buyers to implement a suite of 
‘positive measures’ pertaining to the design, advertising and awarding of contracts. At 
the same time reducing procurement expenditure and making buying processes more 
efficient has assumed priority status in Ireland. Pressures on the country’s public 
finances in the wake of the 2007 international financial crisis have brought this about. 
As with many other countries, the public procurement environment in Ireland has 
become more encouraging of SME involvement, but also more insistent on realising 
‘value for money’.   
Data collection   
Self-report data is relied on in this study. Self-reporting is the most practical means to 
capture information on firms’ tendering capabilities, behaviours and performance 
outcomes. There is also precedent for using self-report data when modelling SME 
participation in public procurement (Flynn et al., 2015; Karjalainen and Kemppainen 
2008; Reijonen et al., 2014; Tammi et al., 2014). Sole reliance on self-report data does 
come with caveats, such as the possibility of respondents resorting to impression 
management when answering questions. Yet there is no evidence to suggest that self-
reporting is inherently flawed or that the criticisms made of it do not equally apply to 
ostensibly objective measures (Chan, 2009). To underpin the integrity of the research 
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and to guard against common method bias1 a number of precautions were taken when 
surveying respondents (Podsakoff et al., 2003). These included guaranteeing anonymity, 
placing questions on tendering activity and performance before questions on tendering 
capabilities, having concise scale items, and limiting the number of scale items to eight. 
Statistical analysis of the data gives no indication that common method bias is present. 
The variance extracted using Harman’s single-factor test is 21.69%, which is well below 
the 50% threshold that would give cause for concern.  
Prior to its distribution and in line with best practice the survey instrument was piloted 
with ten SMEs (Dillman, 2007). The pilot group reported no difficulties with 
comprehending the questions, but did recommend minor adjustments to the phrasing of 
some questions and pre-defined response sets. These were incorporated into the final 
version of the survey instrument. The research was conducted over a two-week period 
in December, 2013. An email notification with an embedded hypertext link to the 
survey was sent to all firms registered on eTenders – the government-managed site on 
which Irish public contracts are advertised. A reminder email notification, also with an 
embedded link to the survey, was issued one week after the initial mailing. By the end 
of the two-week period 5897 responses had been received. Approximately 60,000 firms 
were registered on eTenders at the time of the research, thus yielding a 10% response 
rate. Screening resulted in the removal of 595 large firms i.e. firms employing 250+ 
persons and 2292 substantially incomplete responses i.e. responses that did not progress 
beyond the first e-page of the survey. This left 3010 SME cases for final analysis.   
Representativeness 
Before reporting the representativeness of survey respondents some clarification on the 
public sector marketplace is required. Foregoing research in this area shows that the 
                                                          
1 Variance that is attributable to the measurement method rather than to the constructs the measures 
represent.  
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profile of firms competing for public contracts differs from the universal enterprise 
population. Mainly, small firms are under-represented and medium and large enterprises 
are over-represented relative to their actual number. Proof of this, Flynn et al., (2013) 
ascertained that 51.2% of firms competing for public contracts in Ireland are micro-
enterprises - substantially below their 90.7% share of the national enterprise population 
(Central Statistics Office, 2014). By contrast, 11.7% are large firms even though they 
constitute just 0.3% of the population. The same disparities have been reported in other 
jurisdictions. In the US the number of sole proprietorships competing in the public 
sector marketplace is not representative of their presence in the economy (MacManus, 
1991). The same can be said of the UK. There, data from the Office for National 
Statistics shows that the proportion of small firms using the internet to access tender 
documents or sell to the public sector is only half that of large firms: 19.5% versus 
38.5% (ONS, 2012). These effects can be explained by the fact that a sizeable stratum 
of micro and small enterprises in retail, catering and personal services are focused 
exclusively on business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions. Hence, they are missing from 
the public sector marketplace.   
Given the above, representativeness is understood in reference to the cohort of firms 
active in public procurement rather than the enterprise population per se. Results from 
two tests indicate that respondents are representative of the former cohort. First, 
respondent characteristics were compared against data from a 2011 baseline study of 
public procurement in Ireland carried out by Flynn et al., (2013). Strong similarities are 
evident between respondents and the characteristics of firms in the baseline study (see 
Table 2). On the dimension of size, for example, 54.8% of respondents are micro-
enterprises and 23.3% are large firms. The comparable figures from the baseline study 
are 51.2% and 23.7% respectively. Second, statistical comparisons were made between 
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early and late respondents based on the principle of extrapolation (Armstrong and 
Overton, 1977). Independent sample t-tests did not identify any significant differences 
between early and late respondents on the selected variables of firm size (p = 0.43), 
revenue (p = 0.22), firm age (p = 0.12), tendering frequency (p = 0.39) or contract win-
ratio (p = 0.38). The results from the two tests instil confidence that respondents are 
representative of the cohort of firms active in public procurement; and so the findings of 
the study can be generalised to this same cohort.     
<Insert Table 2 here> 
Descriptive data  
Descriptive analysis of respondent firms reveals the following about them. As referred 
to in the previous section, they are bigger than the average firm in the enterprise 
population. Over one in five respondent firms employ 50 people or more. The 
corresponding ratio in the enterprise population is one in fifty. Reported annual 
revenues lend further support to this observation, with over one in three respondents 
having a turnover in excess of €2 million. Also suggestive of their bigger size, the 
majority of respondents are oriented to national or international markets while only 15% 
concentrate on the local market. The sectoral distribution of respondents is a closer 
match of the enterprise population. Approximately 9% compete in the manufacturing 
sector and 17% in construction. These percentages are coincident with the enterprise 
population in Ireland (Central Statistics Office, 2014). Respondent firms are somewhat 
over-represented in the services sector and under-represented in all other sectors when 
compared to the enterprise population, however. Respondent firms are quite evenly 
dispersed in age terms. Forty-two per cent are under 10 years old and 58% are over 10 
years old.  
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Key statistics for respondent firms’ tendering capabilities and outcomes in public 
procurement are as follows. The mean score for relational capability is 2.82 on a 1-5 
scale. The mean score for procedural capability is 3.60 on a 1-5 scale. Evidently, firms 
rate themselves higher on procedural capability than relational capability. This is not 
surprising given the arms-length nature of public procurement and the challenges this 
poses for SMEs in building relationships and social capital with public buyers and other 
stakeholders (Cabras, 2011; GHK, 2010). The mean figure for the number of tenders 
submitted in 2013 is 8.47. The majority of firms ordinarily compete for contracts valued 
at less than €25,000 (36.1%) or €25-130,000 (39.7%). The mean contract win ratio is 
23.47%. The mean proportion of revenue derived from supplying goods and services to 
the public sector is 19.22%.  
Data screening  
Prior to model testing three standard diagnostic checks for multi-collinearity were 
carried out on the dataset. These did not return any evidence of multi-collinearity. The 
first examined correlation coefficients between all predictor variables (see Table 3). 
Correlation coefficients are found to be in the low-moderate ranges. The highest value 
recorded is 0.532, which is comfortably below the 0.90 threshold proposed by 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) as symptomatic of multi-collinearity. The second 
diagnostic check involved calculating the Value Inflation Factor (VIF) for predictor 
variables in each of the four models. The highest observed VIF is 1.42. Only when the 
VIF exceeds 10 should researchers become concerned about multi-collinearity in their 
dataset (Neter et al., 1990). The third check looked at the Condition Index. As a rule of 
thumb, a Condition Index above 30 indicates a multi-collinearity problem (Belsley et 
al., 1980). Here the Condition Index does not go above 15 in any of the four models.  
                                                          
2 Strong correlations are indicated by r values above 0.7. Moderate correlations are within the 0.3 to 0.6 
range. Low correlations are < 0.3.  
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<Insert Table 3 here> 
Findings 
The effect of relational and procedural capabilities on SME tendering activity and 
performance is tested using two-stage hierarchical multiple regression. The three control 
variables are entered initially. The relational and procedural capability constructs are 
entered second. This is done in respect of tendering frequency (Model 1), contract value 
(Model 2), contract win-ratio (Model 3) and public contracts as a percentage of revenue 
(Model 4). The output from these four models is described below. The standardised 
coefficients (β), standard errors and significance values for the independent and control 
variables in the case of Models 1-4 are contained in Table 4.  
The number of contracts tendered for by SMEs in 2013 - tendering frequency - is the 
first outcome variable tested (Model 1). H1a and H2a state that relational and 
procedural capabilities will each have a positive effect on tendering frequency. At stage 
one the control variables account for 16.2% of the variance. Size, age and sector are all 
significant. Both SME size and age are found to have a positive effect on tendering 
frequency. The construction sector also has a positive effect on tendering frequency. 
The other sectors have a negative effect. At stage two the independent predictors are 
entered into the model. The variance explained increases to 18% as a result. Relational 
capability is non-significant (p =.11). This leads to the rejection of H1a. Procedural 
capability has a significant and positive effect on tendering frequency (p <.01). H2a is 
accepted on this basis.  
The second outcome variable tested is the value of public contracts that SMEs typically 
aim to win (Model 2). H1b and H2b state that relational and procedural capabilities will 
each have a positive effect on contract value sought. At stage one 16% of the variance is 
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accounted for by the control variables. Firm size and sector have a significant and 
positive effect on contract value sought. Firm age is non-significant. The variance 
explained increases to 18% with the addition of the independent predictors at stage two. 
As with tendering frequency, relational capability has no statistically significant effect 
on contract value sought (p = .38). This means that we must reject H1b. Procedural 
capability does have a positive and significant effect on contract value sought (p <.01), 
which allows us to accept H2b.   
The third and fourth variables relate to performance outcomes in public sector 
tendering. The first of these is SMEs’ contract win-ratio for 2013 (Model 3). H1c and 
H2c state that relational and procedural capabilities will each have a positive effect on 
contract win-ratio. At stage one the control variables account for 1% of the variance. 
Firm size has a significant and positive effect on contract win-ratio. The construction 
sector has a significant and negative effect. The other control variables are non-
significant. With the inclusion of the independent predictors the variance explained 
increases to 10%. Both capability types are found to have a positive and significant 
effect on contract win-ratio (p <.01). The effect of relational capability (β = 0.18) is 
slightly larger than that of procedural capability (β = 0.16). These results lead to 
acceptance of H1c and H2c.        
The fourth outcome variable relates to public contracts as a percentage of revenue 
(Model 4). H1d and H2d state that relational and procedural capabilities will each have 
a positive effect on the proportion of SME revenue attributable to public contracting. At 
stage one only 1% of the variance is accounted for by the control variables. Firm size 
and sector are again significant. At the second stage the independent variables are added 
to the model. The variance explained increases to 7%. Both relational capability (p 
<.05) and procedural capability (p <.01) have a positive and significant effect on the 
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percentage of revenue that SMEs derive from public contracts. The effect of procedural 
capability (β = 0.21) is larger than relational capability (β = 0.05) this time round. These 
results offer support to H1d and H2d.   
The results are revealing as regards the effect of two capability types – relational and 
procedural – on SME tendering activity and performance in public procurement. 
Contrary to predictions, relational capability has no enabling effect on  tendering 
activity, whether in respect of actual number of tenders submitted or contract value 
sought. By contrast, procedural capability is significant in explaining tendering activity. 
That said, its effect does not add substantially to the variance attributable to firm size, 
age and sector. Where relational and procedural capabilities assume greater salience is 
in explaining performance outcomes for SMEs. Together they explain an additional 9% 
of the variance in contract win-ratio after controlling for organisation characteristics. 
Relational capability produces the slightly larger effect of the two on this measure. 
Equally, relational and procedural capabilities have a positive effect on the proportion 
of revenue derived from public contracting. On this measure they add 6% to the 
variance explained after controlling for organisation characteristics. Procedural 
capability is the more impactful of the two on this measure. Summarising, organisation 
characteristics in the form of firm size, age and sector are more important than 
tendering-specific capabilities in explaining the number and value of contracts SMEs 
seek to win. When it comes to performance outcomes, however, relational and 
procedural capabilities matter more than organisation characteristics. These results are 
given further consideration in the next section.      
 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
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Discussion  
SME involvement in public procurement constitutes a burgeoning line of inquiry in 
organisation studies. This is due in large part to growing sensitivity at government level 
over the near universal under-representation of SMEs in the public sector marketplace 
and the steps that need to be taken to reverse this situation (OECD, 2013). Asserted at 
the outset, for various reasons research has pre-occupied itself with documenting the 
barriers that confront SMEs when tendering for public contracts rather than predicting 
their levels of activity and performance. Real as these barriers are, scholarly 
investigation has to look beyond them. Consequently, this study set out to explain and 
predict SME activity and performance in public contract competitions by focusing on 
relational and procedural tendering capabilities. The results support the capability-based 
perspective put forward. In particular, they show that SMEs capable of interacting with 
public buyers and proficient in the formal aspects of tendering and contract management 
enjoy superior outcomes. Of course, the study is exploratory in form and represents the 
first testing of a capabilities-based perspective on public sector tendering. Further 
theorising, modelling and empirical research in this area is certainly warranted. Even so, 
it provides a useful starting point for understanding the relationship between tendering 
capabilities and SME involvement in public procurement. The results are discussed in 
more detail below.  
 
That smaller firms are less likely to compete for opportunities with public sector 
organisations, and when they do compete pursue low value contracts has been 
established in research across several countries (BMG Research, 2013; Flynn et al., 
2015; ONS, 2012; Pickernell et al., 2013). Reasons for this include problems in 
identifying suitable opportunities, inability to meet qualification criteria, and 
prohibitively high transaction costs involved in putting together a bid (Cabras, 2011; 
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Fee et al., 2002; Loader, 2005, 2015; MacManus, 1991). What the findings presented 
here show is that procedural know-how can help SMEs to increase their participation 
rates. Specifically, possessing the capability to navigate the procedural formalities of 
tendering and post-tendering is positively associated with the number and value of 
public contracts SMEs seek to win. Relational capability, on the other hand, is not. The 
original hypothesis was that the ability to interact with and persuade public buyers 
would lead SMEs to tender for more and higher value contracts. Elsewhere, proactivity 
on the part of firms in exploiting market information has been linked to contract search 
and bid submission activity (Reijonen al., 2014; Tammi et al., 2014). It may be that 
relational capability, rather than causing SMEs to tender for more and bigger contracts, 
introduces an element of selectivity to their bidding strategies. That is, they are only 
inclined to enter into competitions which they are already favourably positioned to win.   
  
As well as being under-represented as competitors in public contract competitions, 
SMEs are also under-represented as eventual winners. This is borne out by various 
studies which put SMEs’ share of the public procurement market significantly below 
their weighting in the economy (Cabinet Office, 2013; GHK and Technopolis, 2007; 
GHK, 2010; PwC, 2014). Against this backdrop, the identification of relational and 
procedural capabilities as performance drivers is significant. Consistent with 
predictions, the ability to communicate with buyers and influence their supply 
preferences is crucial to improving SMEs’ prospects of success – a conclusion that 
McKevitt and Davis (2013) also reached. Notwithstanding the arms-length character of 
public procurement (Lian and Laing, 2004), such factors as trust, reputation and 
familiarity do enter into a public buyer’s calculus when making decisions over which 
supplier to select. Indeed, given the oft cited high risk-aversion of public buyers 
(Georghiou et al., 2014), these relationship-based factors are likely to prove critical. 
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SMEs are advantaged to the extent that they appreciate this reality and actively seek to 
build social capital with procurement decision makers. As it is with tendering activity, 
procedural know-how is associated with performance outcomes. This is logical given 
the legalistic and bureaucratic nature of public procurement. Undoubtedly, knowing 
precisely what public buyers expect from suppliers and being able to articulate this 
through the formal tender process increases the likelihood of success.  
 
Alongside its scholarly contribution this study yields a number of practitioner insights. 
For SME owners and managers serious about doing business with the public sector 
there is a clear incentive to invest in tendering-specific capabilities – relational and 
procedural. Relevant here is taking the time to formulate strategies for engaging public 
sector actors, researching the supply needs and spend profiles of public sector 
organisations, and acquiring expertise in the assessment criteria used by potential client 
organisations. As has previously been argued by Greer (1999) and as empirically 
substantiated here, success depends on SMEs having the capabilities to match the 
idiosyncratic demands of public procurement; and capability development takes time 
and the commitment of resources (Stalk et al., 1992). Indicated by recent findings from 
Whittaker et al., (2014), SMEs should be prepared to not only develop capabilities in-
house but also to source them externally via collaborations with third parties. More so 
again, they need to demonstrate a willingness and aptitude to learn as an organisation 
and to channel this learning into a product or a service that their customers value (Sanzo 
et al., 2012). While the capabilities public contracting requires of SMEs are sector-
specific, the pressures it imposes for continuous improvement, upskilling and 
professionalism are universal. 
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For enterprise agencies and industry representative associations, the findings suggest 
expanding training provision to encompass the relational side of public sector tendering. 
In the main, training programmes and workshops have prioritised the procedural and 
technical element of tendering over ‘soft skills’ to do with networking and selling to 
public buyers. Yet it is evident in this study that relational capabilities can be even more 
important in determining whether or not SMEs are awarded public contracts. It is also 
evident that SMEs are weaker on relational capability than procedural capability; and 
that this is the area in which the biggest improvement can be effected. Previous research 
indicates that SMEs are receptive to external guidance and support of this kind and 
recognise its value for professionalising their business operations (Marlow, 1992). The 
corollary to SMEs strengthening their tendering capabilities is that public buyers are 
willing to communicate with them, including by debriefing them on unsuccessful bids. 
If public buyers are reluctant to do this, and SMEs claim that they are (Flynn et al., 
2013; GHK, 2010), then the potential for relational and procedural capabilities to 
contribute to superior performance is constrained.   
 
The academic and practitioner contributions of this study notwithstanding, it does have 
limitations. For one, data on tendering capabilities and performance was collected from 
a single source – SMEs. Future research may wish to explore options for collecting 
performance-related data from archival sources; published contract award notices on e-
procurement sites, for example. The study is cross-sectional and covers SME 
involvement in public procurement for 2013 only. Re-running this study at some point 
in the future or, better still, initiating a longitudinal research study is recommended. On 
this point, the migration of public procurement online means that it is becoming easier 
for researchers to survey national populations of suppliers. Research into the 
antecedents of SME activity and performance in public procurement would also benefit 
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from replicating this study in another jurisdiction. While there is a high level of 
institutional commonality in national public procurement systems, particularly within 
Europe (Flynn and Davis, 2015), replication would be useful nonetheless. Finally, the 
capabilities-based perspective propounded here is one of several that can be used to 
explain SME outcomes in public procurement. The previously cited work of Reijonen et 
al., (2014) on entrepreneurial orientations and Tammi et al., (2014) on market 
orientations are others. Going forward, researchers should consider alternative 
theoretical perspectives and models, particularly in the area of strategic planning and 
decision making (see, for example, Basco, 2014).    
 
While the subject matter of this study is SME participation in public procurement, its 
threads spool out to wider contemporary debates and lines of inquiry on small firms. For 
instance, its privileging of a capability-based view of tendering resonates with recent 
studies that have looked at capability types and configurations within small firms and 
how these variously determine growth, internationalisation and competitiveness. 
Barbero et al., (2011) generated interesting findings on the relationship between the 
functional capabilities of managers and the pursuit of high-growth strategies in SMEs. 
Koryak et al., (2015) highlighted the role of leadership in fostering organisational 
capability to grow and learn. Raymond and St-Pierre (2013) examined capability 
alignment in the context of SMEs’ internationalisation strategies, finding it to be of 
critical importance. Not altogether differently, Rice et al., (2015) modelled SME 
performance as a function of the interplay between dynamic capabilities and market 
transformation processes. Already referred to, the findings and their implications also 
speak to overarching research themes to do with SME professionalisation and the 
supportive role that state agencies and industry representative bodies can play in this 
process. As a final comment, public procurement represents relatively unchartered 
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territory for SME and entrepreneurship scholars. They and it have much to gain from 
discovering one another. 
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Figure 1. Predictors of SME tendering activity and performance.  
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Table 1. Principal component analysis. 
 Alpha 
α 
Initial 
eigenvalue 
Percentage of 
variance explained 
Factor 
loading 
Communalities 
extracted 
Mean 
score 
Relational capabilitya .87 2.41 80.39    
Ability to influence buyer needs prior to tender    .89 .80 2.59 
Ability to communicate value proposition to 
inform tender specification  
   .89 .80 3.04 
Ability to promote goods and services to public 
sector prior to tender 
   .89 .80 2.83 
 
Procedural capabilityb   .84 3.13 62.64    
Ability to satisfy tender qualification criteria     .79 .62 3.65 
Ability to understand tender evaluation criteria     .83 .69 3.46 
Ability to effectively respond to tender 
evaluation criteria 
   .89 .79 3.58 
Ability to receive feedback on submitted bids 
and search contract award notices 
   .71 .51 3.13 
Ability to successfully manage an awarded 
contract  
   .70 .49 4.21 
a
 KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy = .74. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity p < .001 (χ = 4530.67).   
b KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy = .83. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity p < .001 (χ = 6134.78).   
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Table 2. Representativeness testing. 
 Respondent % 2011 study % Enterprise population of Ireland % 
No. of employees    
1-9 54.8 51.2 90.7 
10-49 23.3 23.7 7.7 
50-249 11.7 13.4 1.3 
250+ 10.2 11.7 0.3 
Industry    
Manufacturing 8.9 5.5 7.3 
Services 58 57.7 48.6 
Construction 17.3 18 18.3 
All other 15.8 18.8 25.8 
Revenue €    
< 2 million 64.5 62.6 - 
2-10 million 17.2 17.5 - 
10-49 million 9.5 10.5 - 
50+ million 8.8 9.3 - 
Market focus    
Local 15.4 13.3 - 
Regional 17 17 - 
National 45.6 49.7 - 
International 22 20 - 
Firm age 
 
  
0-5 years 24 18.8 - 
6-10 years 17.7 16 - 
11-20 years 25.5 24.6 - 
21+ years 32.8 40.7 - 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlations. 
Descriptive statistics   Correlation coefficients 
Variable Mean SD Min Max VIF* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Tendering frequency (1) 8.47 15.11 0 100 - 1            
Contract value (2) 2.13 1.29 1 6 - .21 1           
Contract win-ratio (3) 23.47 31.12 0 100 - .09 .01 1          
Public contracts as % of revenue (4) 19.22 27.92 0 100 - .37 .18 .43 1         
Size (5) 1.49 .69 1 3 1.29 .35 .36 .09 .07 1        
Age (6) 2.67 1.16 1 4 1.23 .20 .18 .05 .06 .41 1       
Sector: manufacturing (7) .08 .28 0 1 1.10 .01 .09 .05 .04 .19 .14 1      
Sector: services (8) .57 .49 0 1 1.08 .08 .16 .01 .01 .10 .13 .36 1     
Sector: construction (9) .17 .37 0 1 1.08 .16 .13 .05 .06 .04 .03 .14 .53 1    
Sector: other (10) .15 .36 0 1 1.07 .05 .00 .00 .00 .03 .02 .13 .50 .19 1   
Relational capability (11) 2.82 1.06 1 5 1.38 .07 .10 .28 .16 .11 .02 .08 .05 .04 .04 1  
Procedural capability (12) 3.60 .85 1 5 1.42 .20 .21 .27 .24 .21 .10 .03 .02 .06 .00 .52 1 
*VIF from Model 1.   
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Table 4. Predictive test results.  
  Tendering frequency Contract value Contract win-ratio  Public contracts as % of 
revenue  
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b Model 4a Model 4b 
Size .35*** (.42) .32*** (.43) .35*** 
(.03) 
.32*** 
(.03) 
.07*** (.94) .02 (.92) .07*** (.84) .02 (.83) 
Age .05*** (.25) .05*** (.25) .03 (.02) .02 (.02) .01 (.57) .01 (.54) .03* (.50) .03* (.49) 
Sector: 
manufacturinga 
-.05*** 
(.99) 
-.04** (.99) .06*** 
(.08) 
.06*** 
(.08) 
.03 (2.26) .02 (2.10) -.06*** 
(1.98) 
-.06*** (1.93) 
Sector: constructiona .15*** (.74) .16*** (.73) .16*** 
(.06) 
.17*** 
(.06) 
-.05*** 
(1.64) 
-.03** (1.57)  .05*** (1.45) .07*** (1.41) 
Sector: othersa  -.04** (.77) -.03** (.76) .03** 
(.06) 
.04** 
(.06)  
-.01 (1.72) -.01 (1.64) .00 (1.52) .00 (1.48) 
Relational capability  -.03 (.29)  -.01 (.02)  .18*** (.62)  .05** (.56) 
Procedural 
capability 
 .15*** (.37)  .15*** 
(.03) 
 .16*** (.79)   .21*** (.72) 
n 2739b 2739 2626b 2626 2672b 2672 2723 2723 
Constant -5.50*** 
(.77) 
-13.23*** 
(1.29) 
.93*** 
(.06)  
.19* (.11) 18.49*** 
(1.72) 
-15.46*** 
(2.76) 
12.65*** 
(1.53) 
-13.68*** 
(2.51) 
F 107.02 87.04 104.87 86.82 6.91 44.71 7.80 30.12 
Adjusted R2  .16 .18 .16 .18 .01 .10 .01 .07 
***p <.01; **p <.05; *p <.10. The std. error is in parentheses. 
a Sector: services is the referent category.   
b
 Does not equal group total, 3010, due to missing values.  
 
